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Stasis strife definition11/18/2023 This article explores the language of law and politics in Aristotle's ethical writings and the difference between Aristotle's teleological model and the nomological model of Christian ethics, especially in the case of Ockham. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are (efficient) causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature (as well as social environment, early educators, etc.) is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes (sunaitioi) of our dispositions. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis––the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not––there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can still be discerned. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intensional object. Beyond the discussion regarding this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included in the picture, then a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylemorphism is understood. I 1 as a starting point and guiding thread, but relying also on the discussion of in Rh. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. Recently, a strong hylemorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of the causal interaction between soul and body. Second, we argue that Aristotle’s account of the emotions (Rhetoric ii 1-11) with its threefold classification of their causes or features (the disposition of those who experience the emotion those towards whom the emotions are directed the actions or events that trigger them) may pro- vide a more promising explanatory model for the analysis of the causes of stasis than Aristo- tle’s doctrine of the four causes, which is not designed to apply to actions. iii 9), but have become causes of individual and collective action in pursuit of moral and political revolution. v 3), nor simple final (and formal) causes of particular constitutions (as in pol. v 1-3, however, are no longer standalone concepts (as in eth. Notions of “particular” justice as discussed in pol. Stasis is rep- resented by Aristotle as directed towards honour and profit, and finds its origins (archai) in particular occurrences and forms of behaviour, yet all of these are filtered by notions of proportional equality and its basis in worth (axia). v 1-3 Aristotle sees the different conceptions of proportional equality and justice (“in accordance with worth”) as the fundamental cause of stasis and metabole. Much of the scholarly debate on Aristotle’s analysis of stasis in Politics v 1-3 revolves around two interrelated questions: first, the relationship between the three general causes mentioned by Aristotle, especially their logical and temporal connection second, the question of whether, and if so how, Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes should be applied to the analysis of stasis in the Politics.
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